

**Committee:** Historical Security Council

**Issue:** The Palestine Question: Steps for the immediate cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt (30/10/1956: Suez Crisis)

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## INTRODUCTION

Israeli military action in Egypt, commonly known as the Suez crisis, began on 26<sup>th</sup> July 1956 after the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian president, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and was the result of an international dispute. Tensions had been brewing for at least two years, albeit the actual crisis occurred in 1956. Prior to the conflict, the Egyptians had been pressuring the British military to put a halt to the occupation of the Canal Economic Zone, as outlined in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Hostilities in the area were further augmented by battles with Israeli soldiers over the borders, with Nasser evidently expressing feelings of hostility towards Israel.

The trigger cause of the crisis was the United States and Britain refusing to fund the construction of the Aswan High Dam, notwithstanding their previous promises to Egypt. Their refusal to aid in bettering the infrastructure of the Canal served as a punishment to Egypt's growing ties with the Soviet Union and communist Czechoslovakia. Nasser's response, included the declaration of martial law in the Canal Zone and the seizure of the Suez Canal Company, asserting that the dam's construction could be paid for by the tolls collected from ships passing through the Zone.

Britain and France began forming a military force, fearing that Nasser could cut off shipments of oil from Egypt to Western nations, that would in the long run be able to regain control of the Canal, and even depose Nasser. They found an ally in Israel which, due to its hostile treatment, held feelings of hostility and anger towards Egypt. At the same time, the Soviet Union, eager to take advantage of Arab nationalism and, just like Western powers, to gain a foothold in the Middle East, supplied arms from Czechoslovakia to the Egyptian government in 1955. Eventually, the Soviets even facilitated the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile river, by offering funds in contrast to the US's refusal to support the project.

On October 29<sup>th</sup>, 1956 ten Israeli brigades invaded Egypt and began advancing towards the canal, drawing Egyptian forces in the same direction. In accordance with their plan, Britain and France demanded the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian forces from the Canal. On the other hand, the USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev railed against the invasion, while threatening to rain down nuclear missiles on Western Europe were Israeli, British and French troops not to abide.

## DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

### Nationalization

Nationalization refers to when a government takes control of a company or industry, which generally occurs without compensation for the loss of the net worth of seized assets and potential income. The action may be the result of a nation's attempt to consolidate power, resentment of foreign ownership of industries representing significant importance to local economies or to prop up failing industries.<sup>1</sup>

### Martial Law

The law administered by military forces that is invoked by a government in an emergency when the civilian law enforcement agencies are unable to maintain public order and safety<sup>2</sup>

### Ceasefire

An agreement to stop fighting for a period of time, especially in order to discuss permanent peace<sup>3</sup>

### Sovereignty

The authority of a state to govern itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies<sup>4</sup>

### Arab Nationalism

A nationalist ideology that asserts that the Arabs are a nation and promotes the unity of Arab people, celebrating the glories of Arab civilization, the language and literature of the Arabs, calling for rejuvenation and political union in the Arab world.<sup>5</sup>

### Suez Canal

The Suez Canal is an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt constructed by the Suez Canal Company between 1859 and 1869. During the Suez Crisis, the canal was pivotal due to the fact that it was the quickest link between the East and the West.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Kenton, Will. "Nationalization." Investopedia, Investopedia, 12 Mar. 2019, [www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nationalization.asp](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nationalization.asp).

<sup>2</sup> "Martial Law." Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/martial%20law](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/martial%20law).

<sup>3</sup> "Ceasefire (Noun) Definition and Synonyms | Macmillan Dictionary." Ceasefire (Noun) Definition and Synonyms | Macmillan Dictionary, [www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/ceasefire](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/ceasefire).

<sup>4</sup> Philpott, Daniel. "Sovereignty." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 25 Mar. 2016, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/>.

<sup>5</sup> Nationalism.", "Arab." "Arab Nationalism." *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*, Encyclopedia.com, 2019, [www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/arab-nationalism](http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/arab-nationalism).

<sup>6</sup> Fisher, William B., and Charles Gordon Smith. "Suez Canal." Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 13 Feb. 2019, [www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal](http://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal).

## **Imperialism**

A state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas.<sup>7</sup>

## **Non-alignment policy**

Non-alignment denotes a foreign policy which opposes cold war, alliances and aggressive power politics and which stands for independence in foreign relations based on principles such as peace, friendship and cooperation with all.<sup>8</sup>

## **Baghdad Pact**

The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the main purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to prevent communist incursions and foster peace in the Middle East. It was renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, in 1959 after Iraq pulled out of the Pact.<sup>9</sup>

## **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

### **Arab-Israeli Conflict**

The UN Special Committee on Palestine suggested, in 1947, the division of Palestine. It was to be separated into an Arab State and a Jewish State, while the city of Jerusalem would be placed under international trusteeship. Even though the UNGA Resolution 181 approved this Partition Plan, Arab states condemned this imposed state on Palestine. Britain did not wish to implement the Resolution as it did not have both parties' support and thus decided to withdraw from the mandate of Palestine.

On 14<sup>th</sup> May in 1948, the day set for British withdrawal from Palestine, David Ben-Gurion declared the independence of the State of Israel, while it immediately gained recognition from the US and President Truman. A day later, an alliance between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq invaded Israel, on behalf of the Arab League, in this way marking the beginning of the first Arab-Israeli war.

### **The diplomatic backdrop of the Cold War**

Although it has constituted a conundrum, most historians agree that the "beginning" of the Cold War - a state of mutual hostility between the USA and USSR- is marked by the enactment of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 in combination with the Berlin Blockade in 1949. Both powers were trying to extend their "sphere of influence", in order to gain an upper hand over the other in regions like Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Such a country was Egypt, a relatively new country that had just been decolonized.

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<sup>7</sup> Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Imperialism." Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 14 Mar. 2019, [www.britannica.com/topic/imperialism](http://www.britannica.com/topic/imperialism).

<sup>8</sup> "Non-Alignment in International Relation." Your Article Library, 7 Apr. 2015, [www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-politics/non-alignment-in-international-relation/48508](http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-politics/non-alignment-in-international-relation/48508).

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm>

In the wider diplomatic backdrop of the Cold War, in accordance with the competing spheres of influence of the US and the USSR, a non-alignment policy, a form of political philosophy, became increasingly popular among the smaller countries of the Middle East. The theory of non-alignment, originating from V.K. Krishna Menon (an Indian nationalist, diplomat, and politician) in 1953, was quick to become the status quo in Egypt, that took advantage of both powers to receive military and financial assistance. By 30<sup>th</sup> October 1956, both the US and the Soviet Union were attempting to pander to Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, to prevent them from becoming part of the other's sphere of influence.

### **Egyptian Non-alignment policy**

After assuming power in 1954 and having the backdrop of the Cold war behind him, Nasser pursued a non-alignment policy. The notion behind it was to adopt a neutral stance between the US and its allies, and the Soviet Union bloc in order to facilitate Nasser's plans for prosperity in Egypt. One of his main goals was the creation of the Aswan Dam, for which he attempted to receive funds from both the Western and the Eastern bloc. Concerning the Soviet bloc, Nasser signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia a few months after his election, while both the US and Britain promised a considerable amount of funds for the construction of the dam, reaching close to \$70million.

### **Egypt before the crisis**

At the end of World War II, political life in Egypt seemingly united around two major objectives; that is, ending British occupation and introducing social and political reforms. The responsibility for fulfilling these objectives and overthrowing the corrupt monarchy, which was at the time a docile tool of the British, was rendered to the army, and especially junior officers, under the banner of the Free Officers movement and the leadership of Colonel Jamal Abdel Nasser due to a fundamental division of the country's political forces. Nasser's assumption of power on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1952 was primarily a result of his skillful utilization of favorable military and political circumstances resulting from the negative experience of the Palestinian war the Egyptians had participated in. This had intensified the national internal crisis leading to a flurry of activity of the Free Officers. When King Farouk abdicated 3 days later, the Egyptians gave their strong backing to the new order, in what came to be known as the July Revolution.

The years 1952-1954 in Egypt are characterized by internal disputes and confrontations that resulted from the crystallization of the shape of the new political authorities and institutions. The achievements of this period include the Agrarian Reform Law and the agreement with Britain concerning Sudan, followed by the British-Egyptian agreement on the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, completed just a month before the outbreak of the Suez crisis. The years 1954-1955 also saw an apparent thaw in Egyptian relations with the West, to an extent which was relevant to the rivalry between Britain and the US for influence and domination in the Middle East.

After World War II, Britain and the US became rivals concerning their influence on Middle Eastern States. To further elaborate, the World War had caused the British Empire to weaken, in this way enfeebling British dominance in the Middle East, while, at the same time, the US was trying to take over previous British mandates. It is important to note, though, the difference in roles in the Middle East for Britain and the US, respectively. Great Britain took advantage of the region in a defensive manner, mainly by using its imperial routes to transfer oil, while the US attempted to create a stronghold in the Middle East, as part of a global

strategy, meaning with a more offensive character. Notwithstanding, the British desire to maintain control in the region is reflected by the signing of the Baghdad Pact at the beginning of 1955.

The post-World War II Anglo-Egyptian relations seemed to be improving, marking an era of cooperation that granted equal rights and benefits to both sides, while other Arab countries also joined their alliance after their independence. Notwithstanding, the signing of the Baghdad Pact breached relations between Egypt -representing the Arabs- and Britain - representing Western countries. This was because Britain, aiming for a total hegemony in the Middle East, wished to expand the Baghdad Pact to include other Arab States, an action that Egypt opposed to. There were, furthermore, other reasons behind the tensions between the West and Egypt. To name a few; Western countries vehemently supporting Israel and its use as an influential “pressuring force” exerted on the rest of the Arabs, Western countries’ refusal to provide Egypt with essential arms in order to put a halt to the Israeli expansion and Western countries’, and in particular British, reduction of orders for Egyptian cotton, Egypt’s main source of income as a mono-cultural agriculture.

The British, and therefore, Western countries, wanted Egyptian support of their policy or even neutralization. They blamed the failure of all of their efforts in the Middle East single heartedly on Nasser, deeming it thus, necessary for him to be removed by the use of force. Furthermore, after the Algerian uprising in 1954, the French endorsed British opinion, while the USA favored the stance of a neutral adjudicator in the effort to take advantage of the region’s geopolitical ends. Egypt and other Arab countries were not familiar with the notion of putting up a fight versus the USSR and other socialist republics, as not only did they lack interest in the conflict, but were also, at the same time, fighting the West for their independence. Ultimately, this led the public to applaud Egyptian relations with the Socialist Republics, as it was considered an action with practical considerations and significance.

In the meantime, Egypt made efforts for the implementation of its economic development programme in combination with better terms on trade and rearmament necessary to put a halt to Israel’s expansionary policy. Major Western powers, though, had an evident preference towards Israel and thus refused to supply armaments to Egypt. Consequently, the actions of the Western countries essentially urged Egypt to purchase the aforementioned armaments from the Socialist Republics in exchange for cotton, but with no conditions from a political perspective.

Nevertheless, in the middle of 1955, Western powers were seemingly trying to attract Egypt towards their sphere of influence. This was to be done through providing a long-term solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and although several proposals were put forward, there was no considerable involvement. The primary measure through which Western powers tried to incentivize Egyptian support was providing financial assistance to facilitate the construction of the Aswan Dam which held significant importance for Egypt’s socio-economic policies. The West hoped that financial support would ensure Egyptian loyalty to Western policies for the following years. Nevertheless, financial assistance did not have the intended impact; Soviet-Egyptian relations strengthened as well as relations with India and Yugoslavia, Egypt officially recognized the communist Peoples’ Republic of China and opposition to the Baghdad Pact increased. Hence, Western powers tried to, in essence, punish Egypt by withdrawing their offer for financial support. This led to Egypt deciding upon the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26<sup>th</sup>, 1956.

## The Suez Canal

The Suez Canal separated Africa and Asia and thus, constituted a shortcut for travelers from Europe to areas in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. As a result of its strategic location, it was one of the most important shipping lanes on an international level.

The Canal operated its first full year in 1870, during which more than 486 transits took place. As far as transportation of resources go, the Canal constituted the best route for the movement of oil from the Middle East to Europe. To give an illustration, just in 1913, 295,700 tons of oil were transported through the Suez Canal, an amount that increased as the years passed. Even though the main source of income for the Canal was oil, it was furthermore used to transport products like cement and different metals.

The Canal was of great economic importance to the Western powers that used it, even though this was at the expense of Egypt. Its strategic location made it of value to foreign powers like Britain and France, but Nasser thought it was his duty to reclaim what rightfully belonged to the Egyptians, leading to him becoming a national icon and an Arabic leader. On the other hand, Britain and France, holding stocks at the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company felt threatened by Nasser's actions, which were also denounced by other European nations that obtained their oil using the Canal.

## The rise of Pan-Arabic nationalism

The 1952 Revolution in Egypt, brought with it a wave of nationalism aiming to bestir the Middle East as a whole, as rather peculiarly, nationalism was not localized, but partly regional- it was Pan-Arabic in nature. The ideology outlined a revival of the Arab world after the departure of the Ancient Regime of monarchy and the West from the Middle East and it was greatly supported by Nasser, who, as previously mentioned, had risen to power as a result of the said Revolution. Nasser was a charismatic leader, known for even commencing with a public speech after being shot at by a Muslim Brotherhood assassin, and thus, he was fast to galvanize public support not only within Egypt, but across all Middle Eastern countries, for Pan-Arabism. He was one of the first to explore the topics of "Arab Peoples" and an "Arab Homeland" and to quickly manifest this ideology into concrete action, through his support for the Algerian War of Independence versus the French and public condemnation of the Central Treaty Organization. This led to the famous comparison Antony Eden, Prime Minister of the UK at the time, made between Mussolini and Nasser. Eden denounced Nasser saying, "There is now doubt in our minds that Nasser, whether he likes it or not, is now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in Hitler's. It would be as ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him as it was to show weakness to Mussolini."<sup>10</sup>

The issue at hand originated from the nationalization of the Suez Canal, which aimed to serve this rhetoric, as imparted by Nasser. Nasser tried to justify the nationalization of the Canal by condemning the Suez Canal Company, believing it to illustrate colonial dominance and to act as a mechanism for oppression. The commendation it gained by many Arab States was, therefore, understandable as it was seen as a means of defiance against a despotic West.

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<sup>10</sup> Eden, Anthony. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden. Cassell, 1960.

## **MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED**

### **Egypt**

Obviously, the Egyptian government played a major role in the Suez Canal Crisis. Egypt was a British colony that, however, gained its independence. After he declared independence, the Egyptian leader, Colonel Nasser, created ties with the Soviet Union, having observed the lack of collaboration between Egypt and the Western powers, especially on matters such as the renovation of national infrastructure. Having the support of a major power in the face of USSR, Nasser decided to nationalize the Canal and thus, the prohibition of Israeli transit and navigation through it. This decision of his put a permanent strain on Nasser's relations with the West, which agreed to support Israel in a tripartite union and an invasion in Egypt.

### **Great Britain**

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Britain underwent a process of progress on both a political and an economic level. Nevertheless, past imperial beliefs remained among British diplomats, who believed that the possession of strategic areas in the Middle East could significantly boost the British economy. Eden's succession of Churchill further augmented the aforementioned ideals. Nasser's nationalization of the Canal provoked a British desire for military intervention, as the Canal constituted a center of navigation and taxation -among others- and the international community seemed to lack the willingness to solve the situation using peaceful means.

### **France**

The French Republic felt seriously threatened by Nasser's plans, as the company aiming to create the Suez Canal was French. The French Prime Minister characterized Egyptian actions as not only "a breach of international law, but also as a direct attack on the country's prestige and economic interests". Moreover, the Suez Canal was very useful for the French who were currently fighting the Algerian War. Additionally, the French considered Nasser to be behind the Arab uprisings and thus, felt the need for him to be controlled.

### **Israel**

Long before the Suez crisis, Israel had to face guerilla attacks along its borders. To retaliate against these threats, Israel attacked the Gaza Strip, under the control of Egypt, and the West Bank, under the control of Jordan. Israelis believed that ferocity against Jordan and Egypt would constitute a warning for any country wishing to get involved. After Nasser's nationalization of the Canal and the deployment of troops along the Israeli border, Israel considered its best option to be a preventative war against anyone committing an action it considered to be offensive.

### **United States of America**

Using different political and economic means, the US managed to achieve major control over Middle Eastern States, which it used in an era of escalating tensions with the

Soviet Union. Even though the priority of the US was to expand its sphere of influence to the Middle East, it still denounced Nasser's nationalization of the Canal due to the commercial implication it would cause its allies, Britain and France. However, their stances differed as the US considered neither Nasser nor the lack of military intervention to be catastrophic and thus, advocated for a peaceful solution based on international law and UN jurisdiction.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

Notwithstanding the West's lack of support for its ideology, in 1956 the USSR was experiencing a period of relative stability. Soviet leader Khrushchev agreed to support Egypt financially and militarily with weaponry upon the US's refusal, considering it as an opportunity to expand his sphere of influence in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was, therefore, an ally of Egypt, ready to tackle any invasion through any possible means, from missile launching and military actions, to diplomacy.

### TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date	Description of Event
1869	The Suez Canal opens within Egyptian borders but under the control of an international company, later operating under the Constantinople Convention.
1875	Egypt sells its shares of the Canal to Britain due to its increasing debts.
1936	An Anglo-Egyptian Treaty is signed in London, entailing that Egypt is a sovereign State, while allowing Britain to keep its troops in the Suez Canal so as to protect its strategic and fiscal benefits.
January 25 <sup>th</sup> , 1952	British forces attempt to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barrack in Ismailia, resulting in the deaths of 41 Egyptians. This would lead to anti-western riots and consequently, the removal of the Egyptian monarchy and the establishment of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the first president of the Egyptian Republic.
1954	An Anglo-Egyptian Agreement is signed, suspending the 1936 treaty and resulting in the British forces' withdrawal from the Suez Canal.
October 1954	Britain and Egypt come to an agreement on the phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal.
1955	Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain initiate the Baghdad Pact.
17 <sup>th</sup> -24 <sup>th</sup> April, 1956	The Bandung Conference takes place.
April 19 <sup>th</sup> , 1956	The United States of America informs Egypt that it would not fund the building of the High Dam at Aswan, which is followed by British and World Bank withdrawal of funds from the project.
April 26 <sup>th</sup> 1956	Nasser announces the nationalization of the Suez Canal.
June 1956	Nasser accepts a loan of \$1.12 billion at 2% interest rate from the Soviet Union for the construction of the Dam.



August 16 <sup>th</sup> , 1956	Under US support, 24 countries meet in London in order to discuss a plan that reduces the possibility of militarizing the Suez Canal conflict.
3 <sup>rd</sup> - 9 <sup>th</sup> September, 1956	An Australian-led delegation is sent to propose a plan to Nasser, while the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, seeks to distance the US Government from support for military intervention, in the view of President Eisenhower's hopes for re-election in the November US Presidential election.
19 <sup>th</sup> -21 <sup>st</sup> September, 1956	A proposition to create a Suez Canal User's Association in order to run the Canal is made, while the French and British authorities raise the conflict to the UNSC
October 30 <sup>th</sup> , 1956	Nasser rejects the ultimatum to end the hostilities proposed by British and French authorities.

## UN INVOLVEMENT: RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES AND EVENTS

### The United Nations Charter

Four main goals are outlined in the UN Charter; the maintenance of a regime characterized by international peace and security, the development of friendly relations between nations, the fostering of international cooperation and being the center of harmonization of the aforementioned goals. Additionally,

Article V of the UN Charter refers to the Security Council, stating that it is within its responsibility to cater for the upholding of these ideals. In accordance to that, it is furthermore stated that all other Member States ought to adhere to the decisions declared by the Security Council.

### Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom

In 1950 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 337A, entitled "United for Peace". In the aforementioned document, it is outlined that in a case when unanimity between the permanent members is unattainable, an emergency session of the GA can be called, with the aim of considering and providing possible solutions on the matter. The resolution was forwarded to the Security Council, where it was also voted upon and passed. This decision served as a formal statement of the failure of the P5 members to essentially fulfill their obligations in promoting and upholding the ideals set out in the UN Charter.

## PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

The 1888 Constantinople Convention asserts the importance of the Suez Canal and aims at the prevention of conflict in the Middle East region over control of the Canal. Moreover, the convention proclaims a guarantee of access to the Canal by all countries regardless of war or peace, while at the same time maintaining British control of the Canal.

Later on, and specifically in 1936, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed which marked an important step towards improving relations between Egypt and Britain and specifically in

reference to the Suez Canal as it allowed for British military protection. This decision further facilitated British communication with their Asian colonies, for example India, while at the same time proving to be indispensable over the course of the North Africa Campaigns of World War II.

After the turmoil caused by the Second World War, in 1950, the Tripartite Declaration was established. It essentially constituted an alliance between the US, Britain and France, aiming for the establishment of a regime of peace and security in the Middle East as well as the cessation of meddling by Western powers. In order to ratify the agreement, the Allies furthermore ensured that they would play no role in fueling regional rivalries by the provision of armaments to Middle Eastern nations.

Moreover, the Security Council, through Resolution 95, called, at the beginning of 1951, for the cessation of the embargo of Israeli shipping passing through the Canal by Egypt.

In 1954, the second Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, in juxtaposition to its predecessor, demanded that the British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal as a result of the growing feelings of nationalism in Egypt.

Finally, following the withdrawal of British troops, Nasser moved on to nationalize the Canal even though no such thing was outlined in the Treaty. Consequently, the Security Council, voted upon and passed Resolution 118, which affirmed respect of Egypt's sovereignty and the fact that national politics should not in any way influence the management of the Canal.

## **POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS**

In order to be able to provide feasible solutions, one must be aware of the rapidly changing political climate of the post-World War II Middle East. During a period characterized by rapid decolonization, archetypal colonial powers, Britain and France, relinquished their possessions in light of the rise of nationalist and independence movements in areas they occupied. The declining influence of Britain and France in the Middle East left a power vacuum that facilitated competition between newly founded independent Arab States, for dominance in the region, that ought to immediately be addressed.

In the view of the West, there was a need for a "preventative" war, culminating in recapturing lost territories from their Empires and further consolidating power in their other colonial possessions. With Nasser in power, peace and stability in the Middle East were unattainable concepts due to his nationalistic rhetoric.

In order to calm the fears of the West, there was the need to set a groundwork that would respond to future acts of aggression by any country in the Middle Eastern region. Even though the Baghdad Pact was created for the protection of smaller countries from the possibility of invasions or incursions, the extent to which Britain and the US participated made Middle Eastern countries lose their trust in the organization. The fact that that it was based on Iraq, a country rich in oil, and that the Western powers were more concerned with containing the Soviet sphere of influence than protecting the members of the Pact, further amplified the view that it was an imperialist plot. Were a similar organization to be

established, it would necessitate addressing the issue of the superpowers' participation as well as any political differences between Arab Nations.

The Security Council, aiming to bring about a sustainable solution to the Suez crisis, had to put an end to the hostilities between Britain, France, Israel and Egypt first, and secondly, resolve the factors that caused the situation, including the root and multifaceted causes. Countries wishing to extend their sphere of influence, like the UUSR, could easily take advantage of the volatile situation in the Middle East, as evident through the supply of arms Egypt received from the USSR. Even though Western powers attempted, through the Tripartite Declaration, to avoid the crisis, the lack of signatures limited its effectiveness. Britain, France and the US, might have complied with their promises on the topic of arms sales in the Middle East; however, other superpowers were not involved in any such agreement.

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